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Among the greatest emerging challenges to global efforts to promote and protect human rights is the role 
of private sector entities in their actualization, since international human rights rules were designed to 
apply primarily, and in many cases solely, to the actions of governments. This paradigm is particularly 
evident in the expressive space, where private sector platforms play an enormously influential role in 
determining the boundaries of acceptable speech online, with none of the traditional guardrails governing 
how and when speech should be restricted. Many governments now view platform-imposed rules as a neat 
way of sidestepping legal limits on their own exercise of power, pressuring private sector entities to crack 
down on content which they would be constitutionally precluded from targeting directly. For their part, 
the platforms have grown increasingly uncomfortable with the level of responsibility they now wield, and 
in recent years have sought to modernize and improve their moderation frameworks in line with the 
growing global pressure they face. At the heart of these discussions are debates around how traditional 
human rights concepts like freedom of expression might be adapted to the context of “platform law.” This 
Article presents a preliminary framework for applying foundational freedom of expression standards to 
the context of private sector platforms, and models how the three-part test, which lies at the core of 
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Privatization can be a controversial practice. To its proponents, it is an engine 
of efficiency, introducing a competitive atmosphere to stodgy and self-perpetuating 
bureaucracies. However, there are externalities which come into play when 
governments abrogate direct responsibility over an area of administration. A private 
prison may be run at less cost to the taxpayer, but will it respect the rights of inmates 
and devote sufficient resources to their rehabilitation? Privatizing a water company 
could turn it profitable, but this might come at the cost of an increase in contaminants, 
or a refusal to properly service rural areas. Despite the common trope that 
“government should be run like a business,”1 there is an important distinction 
between the core functions of these two types of entities. A private company’s core 
purpose is to maximize profit for its shareholders. A government’s core purpose is 
to promote and protect the rights of its people.2 
Determining how and where to regulate speech is among the most important, 
and most delicate, tasks a government may undertake.3 It requires a careful balancing 
between removing harmful content while providing space for controversial and 
challenging ideas to be aired, and deterring dangerous speech while minimizing a 
                                                          
* Resident Fellow at Yale Law School, leading the Wikimedia Initiative on Intermediaries and 
Information. Sincere thanks to Anna Su, Matthew Marinett, Jack Enman-Beech, Przemysław Pałka, 
Thomas Kadri, Chinmayi Arun, Maren Woebbeking, Anat Lior, and Evelyn Douek, all of whom offered 
very helpful feedback in revising this Article. 
1 Philip Bump, Trump’s Idea to Run the Government Like a Business is an Old One in American 
Politics, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/03/27/ 
trumps-idea-to-run-the-government-like-a-business-is-an-old-one-in-american-politics/?noredirect=on 
&utm_term=.6f0808fab57d. 
2 MORTON E. WINSTON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (Kenneth M. King et al. eds., 
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1989). 
3 See, e.g., Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 976; see also Ford v. Quebec, 
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broader chilling effect that impacts legitimate areas of debate.4 The challenges in 
regulating expression are among the most vibrant and hotly debated areas of law and 
philosophy, with a voluminous body of jurisprudence and academic theory 
addressing how rules limiting speech should be crafted.5 
Today, this entire school of thought has been upended, as the practical functions 
of content regulation are being increasingly handed over to an industry which is not 
only grossly unprepared to handle the subtleties and technical challenges associated 
with defining the contours of acceptable speech on a global scale,6 but has, as far as 
possible, resisted taking responsibility for this function.7 
The origins of this dynamic, and the expanding privatization of content 
regulatory functions which have traditionally been performed by governments, lie, 
ironically, in the intermediary liability protections that date back to the earliest days 
of the commercial internet. Policymakers realized that the commercial and social 
potential of this new medium could best be realized if service providers were 
protected against being directly liable for the words of their users, spurring legal 
protections such as Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act in the United 
States.8 These protections are what allowed scalability of the kind achieved by 
Facebook, Twitter, and other giant online platforms. 
Having been allowed to grow without an expectation of closely policing their 
users, many of the world’s biggest tech firms are built on business models which 
make it very difficult to control how their products are used. Now, governments 
around the world are increasingly complaining about the speech that emanates from 
these platforms and demanding that the companies assume greater responsibility for 
addressing objectionable content. In some cases, these demands involve fairly well 
recognized categories of harmful material, such as hate speech or child abuse 
imagery. Other examples involve content which is outlawed locally, but whose 
                                                          
4 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 34, at art. 19, Freedoms of Opinion and 
Expression, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ 
gc34.pdf. 
5 Kent Roach & David Schneiderman. Freedom of Expression in Canada, 61 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 
(2013). 
6 See, e.g., the persistent failure to apply fair use doctrine to alleged cases of copyright infringement: 
Leron Solomon, Fair Users or Content Abusers? The Automatic Flagging of Non-Infringing Videos by 
Content ID on YouTube, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 237 (2015). 
7 Even today, major platforms’ default is to ask for regulation in this space: See Mark Zuckerberg, 
Mark Zuckerberg: The Internet needs new rules. Let’s start in these four areas, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mark-zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-
start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f0504-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html. 
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prohibition runs counter to global freedom of expression standards, such as risqué 
photos of the King of Thailand,9 or material deemed insulting to Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, Turkey’s founder.10 In still other instances, governmental take-down 
requests are not grounded in any legal standard at all, but rather on the platforms’ 
own independently drafted moderation standards.11 These demands are backed by a 
variety of coercive measures, which depend on the character of the government, as 
well as the amount of leverage it holds over the intermediaries. However, the end 
result is a “privatized” system of content control, which is driven by government 
pressure, but which is also operated and enforced by the tech companies, in many 
cases sidestepping key judicial or constitutional safeguards that were developed to 
prevent the abusive application of content restrictions. 
In response to this dynamic, the biggest global platforms have taken steps to 
rethink their approaches to content moderation. Facebook has taken the most 
decisive moves on this front, through its creation of a wholly independent Oversight 
Board.12 However, there are broader calls for platforms to ground their approaches 
to moderation in independent standards of what constitutes harmful speech, rather 
than relying solely on their own internal considerations of the character of content 
that they want to host.13 One natural focal point of discussions has been to use 
international freedom of expression standards as a guidepost for assessing what 
content should be permitted.14 However, there are significant conceptual challenges 
to this approach, primarily since international freedom of expression standards were 
designed to apply to the actions of governments, rather than private sector actors. 
Nonetheless, a growing number of platforms seem to be embracing this idea to 
varying degrees. However, there is, as of yet, no agreed upon methodology for how 
                                                          
9 Andrew Griffin, Facebook Blocks Video of Thailand’s King Wearing a Crop Top, THE 
INDEPENDENT (May 11, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/ 
facebook-thailand-king-thai-video-crop-top-bodindradebayavarangkun-maha-vajiralongkorn-
a7729886.html. 
10 Zuckerberg Notes Turkey’s Defamation Laws over Ataturk as Facebook Updates Rules, 
HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS (Mar. 16, 2015), www.hurriyetdailynews.com/zuckerberg-notes-turkeys-
defamation-laws-over-ataturk-as-facebook-updates-rules-79771. 
11 Brian Chang, From Internet Referral Units to International Agreements: Censorship of the 
Internet by the UK and EU, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 114, 177–78 (2018). 
12 Brent Harris, Preparing the Way Forward for Facebook’s Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (Jan. 28, 
2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/facebooks-oversight-board. 
13 See, e.g., DAVID KAYE, SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE INTERNET 
(Colum. Glob. Rep. 2019). 
14 U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. 
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exactly freedom of expression principles should be applied to the burgeoning field 
of “platform law.” 
This Article presents a preliminary framework for applying foundational 
freedom of expression standards to the context of private sector platforms. The first 
section of this Article traces the evolution of content moderation at private sector 
platforms, beginning with early light-touch approaches grounded in American First 
Amendment philosophy, and continuing through the adoption of more extensive 
moderation structures in response to growing global enforcement demands. This 
Article discusses both the rise in formal take-down requests, and of informal 
“jawboning” campaigns, which have led major platforms to become more aggressive 
and proactive in their enforcement.15 This section concludes by discussing why the 
status quo is disfavored by virtually all stakeholders involved, culminating in a 
gradual move towards recognizing international freedom of expression standards as 
a core lodestar in developing and applying content restrictions. The second section 
introduces freedom of expression as an international human right, including the key 
sources of international standards that are used to interpret and apply this idea to 
practical regulatory challenges. The section also introduces core conceptual 
challenges to applying freedom of expression in the context of online platforms, 
namely in the gap between their role and that of government. The third section 
presents an avenue forward, and models how the three-part test, which lies at the 
core of understandings of freedom of expression as a human right, could be applied 
to platforms’ moderation functions. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF “PLATFORM LAW” 
A. The Early Days of First Amendment Dominance 
Although specific attitudes varied from company to company, the early years 
of tech platforms’ ascendancy were marked by a fairly hands-off approach to content 
moderation. This was, in some cases, underpinned by a strong libertarian bend with 
regard to user speech. Dick Costolo, a former CEO of Twitter, famously described 
the company as being “the free speech wing of the free speech party.”16 Similarly, 
Reddit’s then-CEO, Yishan Wong, said, in a post to the site’s users: “We uphold the 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., Ángel Díaz, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’s ‘Transparency Report’ 
Raises More Questions Than Answers, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
66298/gifct-transparency-report-raises-more-questions-than-answers/ (an initiative to target and remove 
“terrorist and violent extremist content” which was created under significant pressure from global 
governments). 
16 Emma Barnett, Twitter Chief: We Will Protect Our Users from Government, THE TELEGRAPH 
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ideal of free speech on Reddit as much as possible not because we are legally bound 
to, but because we believe that you—the user—has the right to choose between right 
and wrong, good and evil, and that it is your responsibility to do so.”17 More practical 
support for this position also flowed from the strong intermediary liability 
protections that these United States-based companies enjoyed as a result of Section 
230 of Communications Decency Act, which allowed companies to avoid legal 
responsibility for the words of their users.18 Similarly, in the European Union, the 
Electronic Commerce Directive protects intermediaries from liability so long as they 
act as a “mere conduit,” “cache,” or “host” of user expression.19 In general, without 
a compelling legal requirement to police user content, the companies sought to avoid 
the trouble and expense of closely monitoring their customers. 
There were exceptions to this relatively laissez-faire approach. In particular, 
complaints about the use of platforms as a vector for violating intellectual property 
rights led to some of the earliest moves towards widespread, automated content 
monitoring.20 Some of these interventions were the result of legal requirements, such 
as the notice-and-take-down programs mandated by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.21 However, other moves to crackdown on intellectual property 
violations were an attempt to get ahead of future liability, or another round of tighter 
regulatory rules. In response to recurring complaints about infringement, including 
a high-profile lawsuit from Viacom,22 in 2007 Google launched its Content 
Verification Program.23 The Content Verification Program was subsequently 
rechristened as Content ID, a program to automatically screen uploaded content 
before it is posted against a database of protected files.24 In November 2018, the 
company claimed to have spent over $100 million on developing and implementing 
                                                          
17 Yishan Wong, Every Man Is Responsible for His Own Soul, REDDIT (Sept. 6, 2014), https:// 
redditblog.com/2014/09/06/every-man-is-responsible-for-his-own-soul/. 
18 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). 
19 Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 
2000 O.J. (L 178) I (EC), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031. 
20 Taylor B. Bartholomew, The Death of Fair Use in Cyberspace: YouTube and the Problem with 
Content ID, 13 DUKE TECH. L. REV. 66, 71 (2015). 
21 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998) 17 
U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. 
22 Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
23 Catherine Byni & Soraya Chemaly, The Secret Rules of the Internet, THE VERGE (Apr. 13, 2016), 
https://www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/internet-moderator-history-youtube-facebook-reddit-
censorship-free-speech. 
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Content ID.25 Facebook has its own version of screening software, Rights Manager, 
though this was not introduced until 2016.26 
Child abuse imagery was another area where platforms took strong proactive 
action. In 2009, Microsoft, in collaboration with Dartmouth College, developed 
PhotoDNA, a technology that screens for known images of child exploitation, as 
identified by law enforcement, particularly the National Center for Missing & 
Exploited Children.27 This same technology is now also used by Facebook,28 
Twitter,29 and Google,30 with a common database of proscribed images. In 
September 2018, Google announced that its technology had further evolved, and was 
now capable of identifying new images of child abuse, as opposed to merely 
targeting previously confirmed images.31 
However, apart from these exceptions, as well as certain efforts to combat spam 
and malware, early approaches to content moderation at the major platforms were 
carried out in a relatively unstructured and ad hoc basis.32 Through the 1990s, early 
platforms essentially saw themselves as software companies, with speech 
implications as a mere “secondary effect of their primary business.”33 While 
platforms included various vaguely worded guidelines for acceptable content as part 
of their terms of service agreements, the practical enforcement of these policies was 
                                                          
25 How Google Fights Piracy, GOOGLE 12 (Nov. 2018), https://storage.googleapis.com/gweb-
uniblog-publish-prod/documents/How_Google_Fights_Piracy_2018.pdf. 
26 Analisa Tamayo Keef & Lior Ben-Kereth, Facebook for Media: Introducing Rights Manager, 
FACEBOOK (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/introducing-rights-
manager. 
27 How Does PhotoDNA Technology Work?, MICROSOFT (2019), https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/photodna. 
28 Facebook Security, Want to know how Facebook uses photoDNA? Read a recent blog post by 
the head of our Safety Team, FACEBOOK (Aug. 10, 2011), https://www.facebook.com/security/posts/ 
want-to-know-how-facebook-uses-photodna-read-a-recent-blog-post-by-the-head-of-o/234737053237 
453/. 
29 Charles Arthur, Twitter to Introduce PhotoDNA System to Block Child Abuse Images, GUARDIAN 
(July 22, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/22/twitter-photodna-child-abuse. 
30 Rich McCormick, Google Scans Everyone’s Email for Child Porn, and it Just Got a Man 
Arrested, THE VERGE (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.theverge.com/2014/8/5/5970141/how-google-scans-
your-gmail-for-child-porn. 
31 Nikola Todorovic & Abhi Chaudhuri, Using AI to Help Organizations Detect and Report Child 
Sexual Abuse Material Online, THE KEYWORD (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.blog.google/around-the-
globe/google-europe/using-ai-help-organizations-detect-and-report-child-sexual-abuse-material-online/. 
32 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 
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heavily influenced by traditional American understandings of freedom of speech.34 
The platforms’ early struggles in coming to grips with these challenges were 
exacerbated by the fact that the decision-makers had virtually no experience in global 
freedom of expression norms, or the local human rights situation across the many 
countries where the platforms were active.35 
B. The First Amendment Meets the Global Market 
Since the earliest days of the commercial internet, the fact that so much of the 
infrastructure that facilitates global online communications is based in the United 
States has been a source of controversy.36 These tensions inevitably impact the 
operations of American tech firms doing business abroad, particularly where the 
local political environment is substantially different from the liberal-democratic 
model.37 In general, when a company does business in a particular country, there are 
reasonable expectations that it should abide by local law and customs. However, it 
is obviously not a good look to be seen collaborating with human rights abuses, 
including the repression of dissenting speech.38 
Companies can always choose not to do business in places which demand 
ethical compromises. However, in addition to the commercial cost that withdrawing 
from a country entails, this calculus is made more challenging by the fact that human 
rights determinations are rarely black and white. No country has a perfectly clean 
human rights record. “Bad” countries can make perfectly reasonable demands, and 
“good” countries can make abusive ones. It would be silly to expect Facebook to 
reject a notification of child sexual abuse material just because it was delivered by 
the Russian government, and it is similarly problematic for a company to blindly 
acquiesce to any request emanating from American or Canadian law enforcement. 
As American platforms became global platforms, they inevitably faced 
growing challenges with regard to differing understandings of what types of content 
should be prohibited. With YouTube, for example, early requests from Thailand and 
Turkey in 2006 and 2007 were the first time they had to puzzle through their 
approach to countries whose understandings of freedom of expression differed vastly 
                                                          
34 Id. at 1621. 
35 Id. at 1618–19. 
36 See generally MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT (2002). 
37 See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, Yahoo helped Chinese to prosecute journalist, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-yahoo.html. 
38 Ronald J. Deibert, The Road to Digital Unfreedom: Three Painful Truths About Social Media, 
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from First Amendment values.39 In some cases, content requests touched on highly 
controversial subjects, such as with Facebook’s decision to remove pages linked to 
the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which was then Turkey’s largest pro-Kurdish 
political party.40 Facebook stated that the removals were linked to content supportive 
of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it found to be a violation of its 
prohibition on expressing support for internationally-recognized illegal terrorist 
organizations.41 But while some governments have labeled the PKK as terrorists,42 
not all have, and the question of whether they are a terrorist group or a legitimate 
independence movement is an intensely political one.43 
Moderation questions around Palestinian content tap into an even more globally 
polarized debate.44 Facebook, Twitter and Google have faced enormous pressure 
from the Israeli government to remove material which it considers as inciting 
violence or anti-Semitism.45 The Palestinian Center for Development and Media 
Freedoms (MADA), a leading civil society organization which works to promote 
freedom of expression in Palestine, has complained that the resulting collaborations 
between the companies and the Israeli government have led to legitimate journalists 
and news organizations losing their accounts.46 In the context of the limited media 
landscape in Palestine, deplatforming can be a crippling blow for a journalist or news 
outlet, and the systemic targeting of these accounts has a substantial impact on 
Palestinians’ freedom of expression and access to information, as well as their ability 
to communicate local perspectives globally.47 
                                                          
39 Klonick, supra note 32, at 1623. 
40 Jacob Resneck, Facebook Censorship of Pro-Kurdish Political Party, DEUTSCHE WELLE 
(Nov. 2, 2013), https://www.dw.com/en/facebook-censorship-of-pro-kurdish-political-party/a-17199752. 
41 Id. 
42 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-
organizations/. 
43 See, e.g., Mehmet Alper Sozer & Kamil Yilmaz, The PKK and its evolution in Britain (1984–
present), 31 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 185 (2019). 
44 Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms, Social Media . . . A New Venue to 
Censor and Prosecute Journalists (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.madacenter.org/files/image/editor/ 
FBviolationsE.pdf. 
45 Sue Surkes, Shaked: Facebook, Twitter removing 70% of ‘harmful’ posts, TIMES OF ISRAEL 
(June 7, 2016), http://www.timesofisrael.com/70-of-harmful-facebook-twitter-posts-said-removed/. 
46 Social Media . . . A New Venue to Censor and Prosecute Journalists, Palestinian Center for 
Development and Media Freedoms, supra note 44. 
47 No News is Good News: Abuses against Journalists by Palestinian Security Forces, HUMAN 







S Q U A R I N G  T H E  C I R C L E  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










The above cases are illustrative of how platforms are increasingly finding 
themselves in the middle of politically charged international debates, and essentially 
forced to choose one side or the other. Often, the calculus underlying this 
decisionmaking is unclear, and policies appear reactionary and driven by external 
pressure. In 2019, the United States Government made a decision to officially 
designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist 
organization, the first time this label has been applied to a foreign governmental 
apparatus.48 The following day, Facebook began to delete accounts related to the 
organization and its officers.49 Regardless of one’s opinion of the decision to 
designate a branch of a foreign military as terrorists, this is fundamentally a dispute 
between the governments of the United States and Iran. While it may not be 
surprising that Facebook followed the American position rather than the Iranian one, 
it is nonetheless significant that the company is overtly choosing sides in a state-to-
state conflict. 
The relationship between State pressure and platforms’ enforcement is further 
complicated by the fact that requests from governments are increasingly based not 
on violations of local law, but on platforms’ own content policies.50 Part of the reason 
for this is because of the vague terms in which platforms craft their categories of 
prohibited speech.51 This definition ensures that the platform maintains relative 
flexibility to act against content it finds problematic, but it also turns it into a 
vulnerable target for governments seeking to remove content that they do not have 
the legal authority to target directly.52 A number of States, particularly in Europe, 
have constituted specialized referral agencies which are tasked with monitoring 
social media and filing take-down requests based on perceived terms of service 
violations.53 According to its 2017 transparency reporting, the European Union’s 
Internet Referral Unit enjoyed a 92% “success rate” for platform removal requests 
                                                          
48 Robert Wright, Why Is Facebook Abetting Trump’s Reckless Foreign Policy?, WIRED (May 7, 
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/why-is-facebook-abetting-trumps-reckless-foreign-policy/. 
49 Id. 
50 Chang, supra note 11. 
51 The Twitter Rules, TWITTER (last visited Apr. 7, 2020), https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/twitter-rules. 
52 U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin 
Scheinin, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/51 (Dec. 22, 2010), https://undocs.org/A/HRC/16/51. 
53 Matthias Monroy, German Police launches “National Internet Referral Unit,” SEC. 







J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










dealing with “terrorist content.”54 The same Report makes clear that because the 
material is assessed against the terms of service of the relevant platform, and because 
the ultimate decision to remove the material is in the hands of the platform, their 
referral activity “does not constitute an enforceable act” by the agency.55 
C. “Self-regulation” and Moves Towards Proactive Enforcement 
Beyond relatively targeted take-down efforts, platforms have faced increasing 
pressure to introduce more proactive measures at targeting content which 
governments find objectionable. This process is generally known as “jawboning,” or 
moral suasion, whereby platforms are pressured through threats of regulation to shift 
their broader approach to moderating content in order to bring it into line with 
categories that governments might seek to target.56 In other words, rather than 
initiating a formal take-down process against a particular item, senior officials will 
loudly complain about a particular type of content, including pointing to specific 
examples, and declare that costly and restrictive laws will be considered if the issue 
is not resolved to the government’s satisfaction. 
There are a number of reasons why jawboning is effective. First, platforms may 
view an independently managed policy-shift as cheaper and less unpredictable than 
having to comply with new, binding rules.57 Jawboning also neatly sidesteps 
constitutional challenges that might stand in the way of enacting new laws, as well 
as any political resistance if the new rules are unpopular or controversial. 
Governments who face resistance, either from the public or internally, to new 
legislation may be able to successfully bluff that the laws are just over the horizon. 
However, while there can be benefits to governments employing jawboning as 
a regulatory strategy to push for greater private sector responsibility,58 in the context 
of restrictions on expression this tactic raises concerns. First, it removes the 
opportunity to constitutionally challenge new rules, or to seek judicial clarity 
regarding the scope of speech which is now prohibited. Indeed, the potential for 
jawboning to provide an effective avenue to end-run constitutional limits can be 
                                                          
54 EUROPOL, EU INTERNET REFERRAL UNIT, TRANSPARENCY REPORT 5 (2017), https://www 
.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/eu-internet-referral-unit-transparency-report-2017. 
55 Id. at 4. 
56 Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 50, 57 (2015). 
57 Daphne Keller, Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power Over Online Speech 2, 
LAWFARE (Jan. 29, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-do-you-sue-state-and-platform-
hybrid-power-over-online-speech. 
58 See, e.g., Ronald W. Cotterill, Jawboning Cereal: The Campaign to Lower Cereal Prices, 15 
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viewed as a substantial challenge to democratic norms.59 Second, if the new 
restrictions are unpopular, it is far more difficult for the public to express their 
displeasure at the ballot box, since it can be challenging to point to a direct causal 
connection between government statements and the changes that are ultimately 
instituted. While this dynamic is characteristic of all jawboning campaigns, it is 
particularly problematic given the political nature of speech restrictions, and the 
importance of freedom of speech to the political process. 
Among the most prominent results of governmental pressure campaigns has 
been the creation of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), an 
industry-led self-regulatory initiative that includes Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, 
and YouTube.60 GIFCT works by supporting the development of machine-learning 
algorithms to catch extremist content, as well as through the development of a shared 
hash database, which participating companies use to flag problematic content for 
removal.61 Although the collaboration has been particularly effective at combating 
the spread of ISIS and al-Qaeda-related material, civil society voices have criticized 
its lack of transparency, as well as the way content moderation functions are being 
centralized and harmonized.62 Part of the reason why content removal by private 
sector actors has traditionally been seen as less intrusive than State blocking or 
censoring mechanisms is due to the diversity of the platforms available, allowing 
users to seek a new audience elsewhere if a particular platform rejects them. If major 
platforms begin to consolidate their standards, private sector decisions may take on 
the gravity of a global ban. 
Even more concerning has been the drift from demanding action to curtail hate 
speech and incitement to violence, which are legitimate areas of State regulation, to 
pushing for more intensive efforts to combat misinformation, or “fake news.”63 For 
example, in May 2019 Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced as part 
                                                          
59 Michael Karanicolas, Subverting Democracy to Save Democracy: Canada’s Extra-
Constitutional Approaches to Battling ‘Fake News,’ 17 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 201 (2019). 
60 About Our Mission, GLOBAL INTERNET FORUM TO COUNTER TERRORISM (last visited Mar. 27, 
2020), https://www.gifct.org/about/. 
61 Press Release, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and 
YouTube Announce Formation of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (June 26, 2017), 
https://gifct.org/press/facebook-microsoft-twitter-and-youtube-announce-formation-global-internet-
forum-counter-terrorism/. 
62 Opinion, Emma Llansó, Platforms Want Centralized Censorship. That Should Scare You, WIRED 
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/platforms-centralized-censorship/. 
63 Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 
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of the country’s “Digital Charter” that platforms which failed to adequately take 
action against misinformation would face “meaningful financial consequences.”64 
In contrast to hate speech and incitement, laws prohibiting misinformation are 
generally not acceptable according to international freedom of expression standards. 
This was reiterated in the 2017 Joint Statement by the Special Mandates on Freedom 
of Expression, which specifically addressed responses to misinformation: 
Stressing that the human right to impart information and 
ideas is not limited to “correct” statements, that the right 
also protects information and ideas that may shock, 
offend and disturb, and that prohibitions on 
disinformation may violate international human rights 
standards, while, at the same time, this does not justify the 
dissemination of knowingly or recklessly false statements 
by official or State actors; 
. . . 
2. Standards on Disinformation and Propaganda: 
a. General prohibitions on the dissemination of 
information based on vague and ambiguous 
ideas, including “false news” or “non-
objective information,” are incompatible with 
international standards for restrictions on 
freedom of expression, as set out in paragraph 
1(a), and should be abolished.65 
There are a number of reasons why misinformation laws are problematic, 
including that they essentially grant authorities the power to dictate a single, correct 
version of “the truth,” and to target voices which deviate from that agreed narrative. 
While it is easy to point to harmful kinds of misinformation, such as, for example, 
the distribution of fictitious theories about the dangers of vaccination,66 it is 
practically impossible to craft a legal prohibition against misinformation which 
would not lend itself to abuse in targeting more benign forms of dissent. Where laws 
                                                          
64 Trudeau Warns of Meaningful Financial Consequences for Social Media Giants that Don’t 
Combat Hate Speech, CBC (May 16, 2019, 8:49 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/digital-charter-
trudeau-1.5138194. 
65 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Joint Declaration on Freedom of 
Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda, ORG. AM. STS. (Mar. 3, 2017), 
www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=1056&lID=1. 
66 Ayelet Evrony & Arthur Caplan, The Overlooked Dangers of Anti-Vaccination Groups’ Social 
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against “fake news” are in force, they are often abused to target opposition 
politicians, journalists, and civil society.67 
D. Pressure from All Sides 
The pressures described here have left platforms between a rock and a hard 
place when it comes to content moderation. While most major platforms have been 
loath to accept full responsibility for the content that they host or otherwise 
facilitate,68 it seems manifestly clear that the current status quo is untenable, given 
the dissatisfaction of all major stakeholders, and growing tensions permeating the 
system. 
Governments are pressuring major intermediaries to do more and appear 
increasingly unsatisfied with the perceived inconsistency and unreliability in private 
content moderation structures.69 In parallel to this general dissatisfaction, 
governmental demands have escalated over the past few years. In part, this may be 
attributed to a kind of “ratchet effect,”70 where all governments demand that their 
requests be treated with the highest level of priority and urgency that platforms 
accord to other governments. As a result, acquiescing to demands from one 
government can lead to escalating demands from many others. Since the European 
Commission’s Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online first 
imposed a 24-hour turnaround time for removing certain content, that standard has 
been followed by other governments.71 More recently, proposals from the European 
Parliament could push the deadline for responding to “terrorist content” notifications 
                                                          
67 Daniel Funke, A Guide to Anti-misinformation Actions Around the World, THE POYNTER 
INSTITUTE (Oct. 31 2018), https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2018/a-guide-to-anti-misinformation-
actions-around-the-world/. 
68 Yishan Wong, Every Man Is Responsible for His Own Soul, REDDIT (Sept. 6, 2014), https:// 
redditblog.com/2014/09/06/every-man-is-responsible-for-his-own-soul/. 
69 Makena Kelly, Facebook, YouTube, and Others Asked to Brief Congress on New Zealand 
Shooting Response, THE VERGE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/19/18273257/ 
facebook-youtube-microsoft-twitter-congress-zealand-shooting-response. 
70 What is Ratchet Effect?, THE LAW DICTIONARY (last visited Apr. 7, 2020), https:// 
thelawdictionary.org/ratchet-effect/. 
71 See, e.g., Javier Pallero, Honduras: New Bill Threatens to Curb Online Speech, ACCESS NOW 
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.accessnow.org/honduras-new-bill-threatens-curb-online-speech/ 
(discussing Honduras’ proposed cybersecurity bill); see also Paris Martineau, India’s Plan to Curb Hate 
Speech Could Mean More Censorship, WIRED (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/indias-plan-
curb-hate-speech-mean-more-censorship/?verso=true (discussing the fact that India is considering 
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to just one hour, which would make meaningful assessment of the material under 
review practically impossible.72 
The platforms have expressed deep discomfort with the level of responsibility 
and power they wield over the global expressive discourse.73 Nicole Wong, a former 
lawyer at Google, admitted her own difficulty in trying to deal with “the norms of 
behavior when what’s appropriate is constantly reiterated. If you layer over all of 
that the technology change and the cultural, racial, national, [and] global 
perspectives, it’s all just changing dramatically fast. It’s enormously difficult to 
figure out those norms, let alone create policy to reflect them.”74 
This dynamic is further complicated by the commercial pressures that platforms 
face in hosting controversial speech, since the companies mainly rely on advertising 
to draw in revenue. In March 2017, a number of brands began to pull advertising 
from YouTube after discovering their ads were being posted next to extremist 
content.75 A similar exodus of advertisers took place in 2019, after it was discovered 
that users were leaving sexually suggestive comments on videos of young girls, and 
potentially utilizing the site’s recommendation algorithm to find similar videos.76 
YouTube’s actions in responding to these issues were not particularly 
controversial.77 But the episodes illustrate a potential tension between advertisers, 
who may be reluctant to have their products associated with polarizing ideas, and 
users, who view platforms as their primary mechanism for self-expression and 
political engagement, and may dislike moderation structures that substantially 
narrow the boundaries of acceptable content to that which is universally viewed as 
uncontroversial. This tension exacerbates a misaligned incentive structure, noted by 
                                                          
72 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, COM (2018) 640 final (Sept. 12, 2018). 
73 See, e.g., Kara Swisher & Kurt Wagner, Here’s the transcript of Recode’s interview with 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg about the Cambridge Analytica controversy and more, VOX (Mar. 22, 
2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/3/22/17150814/transcript-interview-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-
cambridge-analytica-controversy. 
74 Klonick, supra note 32, at 1628. 
75 Lara O’Reilly, The Real Motivations Behind the Growing YouTube Advertiser Boycott, BUS. 
INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.my/why-advertisers-are-pulling-spend-from-
youtube-2017-3/. 
76 Jim Waterson, Fortnite Maker Pulls Ads over YouTube ‘Paedophile Ring’ Claims, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/21/fortnite-maker-pulls-
ads-over-youtube-paedophile-ring-claims. 
77 Alex Hern, YouTube turns off comments on videos of children amid child safety fears, THE 
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Jack Balkin among others, between platforms as media companies and platforms as 
surveillance companies, with the latter representing their core business model.78 
The unreliable and reactionary nature of the current system undermines the 
interests of users, advertisers, governments, and the platforms themselves. More 
broadly, the past few years have seen a public backlash against the unprecedented 
power that platforms wield. Since the 2016 scandals over the use of online platforms 
to interfere in both the United States presidential election and the United Kingdom’s 
Brexit vote,79 there have been a near constant stream of negative media stories about 
content-moderation failures at major tech firms. These include allegations that 
moderation standards discriminate against LGBTQ users80 as well as other 
marginalized groups,81 that recommendation algorithms are helping to spread anti-
vaccination misinformation,82 and that YouTube’s algorithms were removing 
evidence of Syrian chemical weapons attacks which had been uploaded by 
journalists or witnesses on the ground, and which in some instances may not have 
been backed up elsewhere.83 The volume of stories, and the growing public sentiment 
against major platforms, has led to prominent calls for Facebook, in particular, to be 
broken up,84 or even nationalized.85 
                                                          
78 Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media, SSRN (Nov. 8, 2019), https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=3484114. 
79 Henry Farrell & Bruce Schneier, Common-Knowledge Attacks on Democracy, BERKMAN KLEIN 
CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3273111. 
80 Samantha Allen, Social Media Giants Have a Big LGBT Problem. Can They Solve It?, THE 
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/social-media-giants-have-a-big-lgbt-
problem-can-they-solve-it. 
81 Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, A White man called her kids the n-word Facebook stopped her 
from sharing it, WASH. POST (July 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ for-
facebook-erasing-hate-speech-proves-a-daunting-challenge/2017/07/31/922d9bc6-6e3b-11e7-9c15-
177740635e83_story.html. 
82 Julia Carrie Wong, How Facebook and YouTube Help Spread Anti-Vaxxer Propaganda, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/feb/01/facebook-youtube-anti-
vaccination-misinformation-social-media. 
83 Kate O’Flaherty, YouTube Keeps Deleting Evidence of Syrian Chemical Weapon Attacks, WIRED 
(June 26, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/chemical-weapons-in-syria-youtube-algorithm-delete-
video. 
84 Chris Hughes, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebook-zuckerberg.html. 
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E. Searching for an Exit Strategy 
In considering solutions to this problem, an increasing number of voices have 
pointed to international human rights rules as the key lodestar to developing global 
solutions to moderating online content. David Kaye, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression has been particularly vocal as an advocate for an approach guided by 
human rights norms: 
Companies should recognize that the authoritative global 
standard for ensuring freedom of expression on their 
platforms is human rights law, not the varying laws of 
States or their own private interests, and they should re-
evaluate their content standards accordingly. Human 
rights law gives companies the tools to articulate and 
develop policies and processes that respect democratic 
norms and counter authoritarian demands. This approach 
begins with rules rooted in rights, continues with rigorous 
human rights impact assessments for product and policy 
development, and moves through operations with 
ongoing assessment, reassessment and meaningful public 
and civil society consultation.86 
Increasingly, it appears as though platforms are receptive to this idea. The most 
significant announcement in this regard has been Facebook’s decision to create an 
independent Oversight Board, which Mark Zuckerberg, in announcing the initiative, 
compared to the platform having its own “Supreme Court.”87 In January 2020, 
Facebook released its proposed bylaws for the Oversight Board, which included a 
commitment to implement their decisions in a way which is “guided by relevant 
human rights principles.”88 It also named the Oversight Board’s first Director as 
Thomas Hughes, who had previously served as the Executive Director of Article 19, 
a global human rights organization.89 The choice of such a prominent figure from the 
human rights community is strongly suggestive of an intent for international human 
                                                          
86 U.N. Human Rights Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018), https://undocs.org/A/HRC/38/35. 
87 Ezra Klein, Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s Hardest Year, and What Comes Next (Apr. 2, 
2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17185052/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-interview-fake-news-bots-
cambridge. 
88 FACEBOOK, OVERSIGHT BOARD BYLAWS (Jan. 2020), https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2020/01/Bylaws_v6.pdf. 
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rights standards, particularly around freedom of expression, to play a major role in 
the Board’s decision-making. 
While Facebook has taken the most significant steps towards recognizing the 
role of international freedom of expression standards in guiding its decision-making, 
they are not alone in charting this path. Twitter’s site rules, for example, feature 
statements pointing to the role of freedom of expression as an international human 
right in its decision-making, including a specific reference to the European 
Convention on Human Rights.90 Likewise, the Global Network Initiative (GNI), 
which counts a number of prominent intermediaries including Facebook, Google, 
and Microsoft among its members, makes specific reference to the role of 
internationally recognized laws and standards for human rights, including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),91 in developing their 
core standards.92 The GNI principles include references to freedom of expression, 
though it is worth noting that this is specifically defined in terms of government 
restrictions on speech, and not the platforms’ own content guidelines.93 In early 2020, 
TikTok announced its own plans to constitute a “Content Advisory Council” to 
provide external input into its content moderation policies.94 Though this process 
does not appear to be modelled on human rights norms, it is significant insofar as it 
reflects the company’s sensitivity to the need to seek broader legitimacy around 
decisions in this space. 
II. UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
STANDARDS 
A. Freedom of Expression as an International Human Right 
Freedom of expression is a core human right, which is protected under virtually 
every constitution in the world, along with all of the main international and regional 
human rights treaties. This includes, most notably, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General 
                                                          
90 Defending and Respecting the Rights of People Using our Service, TWITTER, https:// 
help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/defending-and-respecting-our-users-voice (last visited Apr. 10, 
2020). 
91 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
92 Global Network Initiative, GNI Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy 1 (2018), 
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/gni-principles/. 
93 Id. 
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Assembly in 1948: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; 
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”95 
The status of freedom of expression as a right is reinforced and expanded in 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; 
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 
of this article carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided 
by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public 
order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.96 
Similar language has been incorporated into a number of regional treaties, such 
as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights,97 the European Convention 
on Human Rights,98 and the American Convention on Human Rights.99 
A core aspect of the right to freedom of expression, as framed in the ICCPR, is 
that restrictions on speech are required to comply with a strict three-part test: the 
restrictions must be “provided by law;” they may only be imposed for a legitimate 
purpose; and they must conform to strict tests of necessity and proportionality. 
International human rights treaties, and in particular the ICCPR, have given rise 
to a robust body of international human rights standards on interpreting the right to 
                                                          
95 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
96 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 91. 
97 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). 
98 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 and supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 
and 13, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. 5. 
99 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 
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freedom of expression, beginning with the General Comments issued by the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee. The most recent of these addressing freedom of 
expression was General Comment No. 34, which was published in 2011.100 It 
includes a thorough discussion on interpreting the three-part test, including that 
restrictions on speech must meet standards of clarity to be considered as having been 
“provided by law,” such as being publicly accessible, being constructed with 
“sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct 
accordingly,” and limiting the degree of discretion related to their execution.101 
Partly this standard is related to fundamental notions of procedural fairness, but it is 
also meant to limit, as far as possible, any potential “chilling effect,” where 
uncertainty about what is and is not permitted causes people to steer well clear of the 
line, and potentially even avoid controversial topics entirely. General Comment 
No. 34 also further elaborates on the standard of “necessity,” which incorporates a 
basic assessment of proportionality: 
Restrictions must not be overbroad. The Committee 
observed General Comment No. 27 that “restrictive 
measures must conform to the principle of 
proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their 
protective function; they must be the least intrusive 
instrument amongst those which might achieve their 
protective function; they must be proportionate to the 
interest to be protected . . . . The principle of 
proportionality has to be respected not only in the law that 
frames the restrictions but also by the administrative and 
judicial authorities in applying the law.” The principle of 
proportionality must also take account of the form of 
expression at issue as well as the means of its 
dissemination. For instance, the value placed by the 
Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high 
in the circumstances of public debate in a democratic 
society concerning figures in the public and political 
domain. 
When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for 
restriction of freedom of expression, it must demonstrate 
in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature 
of the threat, and the necessity and proportionality of the 
specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct 
and immediate connection between the expression and the 
threat. [references omitted]102 
                                                          
100 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 34, supra note 4. 
101 Id. ¶ 25. 
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B. Interpreting and Applying Freedom of Expression 
There are a wide variety of sources for drilling down into the applicability of 
broad human rights concepts, like the three-part test, to specific challenges. These 
include decisions of the UN Human Rights Committee, as well as regional bodies 
such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, and statements from special mandates appointed by standard setting 
organizations, such as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Representative on Freedom of the Media. 
In addition to appropriate treaty law, jurisprudence, and statements, scholarly 
treatment of freedom of expression can be another source for establishing 
international human rights standards, along with publications or statements from 
expert civil society groups specializing in this area (such as Article 19,103 Human 
Rights Watch,104 and the Centre for Law and Democracy105). Joint civil society 
statements or declarations can be particularly useful, as they may demonstrate a 
consensus among advocates working on these issues. For example, the Necessary 
and Proportionate Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance have attracted an extremely broad base of signatories, 
reflecting widespread support among global human rights experts and 
practitioners.106 
None of these sources are prescriptive, in terms of providing a specific, 
universally applicable formula for how speech should be governed. Nonetheless, 
taken together they provide a robust and extensive body of standards which are useful 
to inform regulatory approaches. In particular, they can assist in defining what an 
unacceptable restriction looks like, and identifying potential areas of concern with a 
given regulatory strategy based on this understanding. 
                                                          
103 Defining Defamation: Principles on Freedom of Expression and Protection of Reputation, ART. 
19 (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.article19.org/resources/defining-defamation-principles-on-freedom-of-
expression-and-protection-of-reputation/. 
104 Promote Strong Encryption and Anonymity in the Digital Age, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(June 17, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/17/promote-strong-encryption-and-anonymity-
digital-age-0. 
105 TOBY MENDEL, Restricting Freedom of Expression: Standards and Principles, CENTRE L. & 
DEMOC. (Mar. 2010), http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/10.03.Paper-on-
Restrictions-on-FOE.pdf [hereinafter MENDEL, Restricting]. 
106 International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, 
NECESSARY & PROPORTIONATE (May 2014), https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/ (last visited 
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For example, with regard to hate speech or incitement, while specific national 
approaches to regulation differ, international human rights standards have coalesced 
around a number of key elements for how these laws should operate. The starting 
point is Article 19 of the ICCPR, along with Article 20(2), which mandates that 
“advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”107 However, the text 
leaves open questions as to how one should craft an appropriate balance between this 
rule and the right to freedom of expression. Relevant case law is appropriate to tease 
out guiding principles, such as the requirement that prescribed speech should be 
intended to generate hatred, which is important to ensure that journalists or anti-racist 
advocacy groups who may reprint hateful statements to call attention to them are not 
caught under these rules.108 Likewise, international courts have repeatedly found that 
assessing whether something is hate speech is an inherently contextual 
determination, based on whether the material was released under circumstances 
where it is likely to actually generate harm.109 This means, for example, that an 
identical statement made in Myanmar and in Canada might be considered hate 
speech in the former but not in the latter, given the differing levels of underlying 
ethnic tensions which would be relevant to assessing its impact. 
To take another example, while the ICCPR recognizes the legitimacy of rules 
to protect “the rights or reputations of others” (i.e., defamation), recent treatment of 
this issue has focused on the need to consider the proportionality of these restrictions 
carefully, including a preference for civil restrictions rather than criminal ones.110 
Even in dealing with obscenity, an area of regulation that is especially tied to 
local cultures and traditions, it is possible to draw out some useful standards. In 
General Comment No. 34, the UN Human Rights Committee noted the importance 
of developing standards of morality in an inclusive and non-discriminatory manner: 
The Committee observed in General Comment No. 22, 
that “the concept of morals derives from many social, 
philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, 
limitations . . . for the purpose of protecting morals must 
be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a 
single tradition.” Any such limitations must be 
                                                          
107 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 91. 
108 Jersild v. Denmark, No. 15890/89, ECHR 33, 19 EHRR 1 (1994). 
109 Erbakan v. Turkey, App. No. 59405/00 (ECtHR, 6 July 2006); Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case 
No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003). 
110 Abid Hussain, Freimut Duve & Santiago Canton, International Mechanisms for Promoting 
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understood in the light of universality of human rights and 
the principle of non-discrimination111 
This last example is particularly illustrative of how international human rights 
standards present a set of values and characteristics that should inform the crafting 
and application of laws. Another way to think about this would be that international 
human rights standards define an appropriate spectrum for domestic regulatory 
approaches, as well as general values which should inform their development and 
application. While they typically are not prescriptive of exactly where on that 
spectrum a country should place itself, they anticipate that a regulatory approach 
should take place somewhere within these defined boundaries. 
C. Challenges in Applying Freedom of Expression to the Context of 
Platforms 
International freedom of expression standards are generally understood to 
restrict the actions of governments, rather than private actors. This is not to suggest 
a complete divorce between ICCPR principles and the private sector. Molly Land 
has argued convincingly that the original intent of Article 19(2) contemplates private 
as well as public interferences.112 However, this is not, in practical terms, how the 
global jurisprudence evolved in the decades since the ICCPR was first promulgated. 
State governments are the primary duty bearers for safeguarding rights.113 
While it is broadly recognized that human rights violations can be committed by 
private sector actors, such abuses are ultimately understood as a governmental 
failure.114 If an oil company, for example, employs thugs to attack environmental 
campaigners, the abuse may have been perpetrated by the company, but it is the 
government which failed in its responsibility to protect these activists. Likewise, the 
government will assume a subsequent duty to pursue an appropriate remedy, by 
investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators. This is consistent with the 
government’s monopoly on coercive powers, such as the right to imprison. This does 
not, of course, absolve private actors for their own culpability when they are 
complicit in or responsible for human rights violations.115 However, the dynamic of 
                                                          
111 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 34, supra note 4, ¶ 32. 
112 Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 393, 446 (2013). 
113 James W. Nickel, How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide, 15 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 77 (1993). 
114 See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Honduras/Guatemala: Attacks on the rise in world’s deadliest countries 
for environmental activists (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.amnesty.ca/news/hondurasguatemala-attacks-
rise-world’s-deadliest-countries-environmental-activists. 
115 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and 
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responsibility is significantly different, including, because private sector entities 
operate with more limited powers, and are subject to regulation by governments. 
The duty of governments to regulate in this space is further reinforced by the 
fact that human rights rules often include a specific obligation for States to take 
action to prevent rights violations by third parties.116 While this obligation is most 
commonly applied in the context of physical attacks against human rights 
campaigners, it also includes components that are rooted in a responsibility to pass 
laws which facilitate a robust expressive environment, particularly in the realm of 
broadcast regulation: 
[T]he State may be required to put in place positive 
measures to ensure that its own actions contribute to the 
free flow of information and ideas in society, what may 
be termed “direct” positive measures. This might involve, 
for example, putting in place a system for licensing 
broadcasters which helps ensure diversity and limit media 
concentration. Perhaps the most significant example of 
this is the relatively recent recognition of the obligation 
of States to put in place a legal framework to provide for 
access to information held by public bodies. [references 
omitted]117 
Despite their power and reach, platforms play a very different role from 
governments, which demands a different understanding of how human rights values 
apply to their operations. It would be a huge conceptual leap to apply a governmental 
model of freedom of expression obligations to private sector platforms. If YouTube 
decided to transition to a subscription model, such that their videos were only visible 
to paying customers, this would certainly run counter to the idea of promoting “the 
free flow of information and ideas.” It would also undoubtedly be within their rights 
as a company to pursue that revenue stream. 
In terms of moderating content, platforms, like all private sector actors, also 
enjoy a robust “right not to speak.”118 Their freedom to curate their medium as they 
see fit, and to avoid hosting content they dislike, is a well-established aspect of their 
                                                          
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 
UNHRC, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ 
Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf. 
116 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 91, at art. 20(2). 
117 MENDEL, Restricting, supra note 105. 
118 Ediciones Tiempo S.A. v. Spain, App. No. 13010/87, 62 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247, 
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own freedom of expression rights.119 Of course, this right is not absolute.120 
However, it creates a substantially different dynamic than one might expect in a 
governmental context. This gap, between the theoretical framework in which 
international freedom of expression principles have traditionally been applied, and 
the practical realities of private sector content moderation, is the focus of the next 
section. 
III. SQUARING THE CIRCLE 
A. The Utility of Human Rights Standards 
Despite the baseline contextual challenges in their application to a purely 
private sector context, international human rights standards are a promising solution 
to the present crisis of legitimacy impacting platforms’ content moderation 
structures.121 International freedom of expression standards are virtually the only 
conceptual framework for assessing the boundaries of acceptable speech which 
transcends national law.122 By providing a spectrum of potential responses, as 
opposed to a single right answer to moderation challenges, human rights standards 
help to head off a trend towards consolidation or homogeneity across platforms.123 
This is important to preserving the diversity of content enforcement, which is a key 
feature of the current system.124 The idea that content which is not fit for Facebook 
might still find a home on Twitter or Reddit is important insofar as it prevents a 
single adverse content decision from bearing the weight of a global ban. From this 
perspective, a conceptual framework which preserves some equivalent to the 
“margin of appreciation” doctrine, as applied by the European Court of Human 
Rights to grant leeway to governments in finding solutions which suit local needs, is 
                                                          
119 United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 433–34 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
(denying en banc review of a decision upholding the FCC’s net-neutrality rules) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that net neutrality rules violated ISPs’ First Amendment rights). 
120 For example, governments frequently impose “must-carry requirements” on broadcasters, 
whereby operators are required to carry particular stations or types of content. These are well-established 
aspects of a robust broadcasting regulatory framework; International Mechanisms for Promoting 
Freedom of Expression, Joint Declaration on Diversity in Broadcasting, ORG. OF AM. STATES (2007), 
www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=719&lID=1. 
121 See Jonathan Zittrain, Three Eras of Digital Governance, SSRN (Sept. 23, 2019), https://ssrn 
.com/abstract=3458435. 
122 Frans Viljoen, Exploring the Theory and Practice of the Relationship between International 
Human Rights Law and Domestic Actors, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 177, 179 (2009). 
123 Llansó, supra note 62. 
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vital.125 The value of a human rights-based framework is not to tell us who is “right,” 
but rather to ensure that each policy is clear, consistently applied, non-
discriminatory, and appropriately proportional in their enforcement. 
For example, each platform currently has its own definition of what counts as 
“hate speech.” For Facebook, this is defined as “a direct attack on people based on 
what we call protected characteristics—race, ethnicity, national origin, religious 
affiliation, sexual orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender identity, and serious disease 
or disability” and with “some protections for immigration status.”126 Twitter bans 
“hateful conduct,” rather than hate speech specifically, a category which is defined 
inclusively as incorporating violent threats, calling for harm against a person or 
groups, inciting fear, using slurs, or referencing violent events.127 Google provides 
no working definition at all, beyond “promoting violence or hatred against 
individuals or groups” on the basis of a list of specific attributes.128  
While there is value to this diversity, platforms and their users would greatly 
benefit from building on the decades of established jurisprudence that human rights 
law provides, as an avenue to making their respective enforcement systems more 
resilient, reliable, and transparent than the current paradigm, which is heavily 
weighted towards speed and efficiency. However, in order to properly implement 
international freedom of expression concepts, these principles must first be adapted 
to the specific context in which platforms operate. The natural starting point would 
be the three-part test for legitimate restrictions on speech, as spelled out in the 
ICCPR. This requires that any restrictions must be provided by law, imposed for a 
legitimate purpose, and consistent with fundamental principles of necessity and 
proportionality. Each aspect of this test requires some reconsideration to apply to the 
context of platforms. 
B. Provided by Law 
The first branch of the test, that restrictions be provided by law, imposes 
standards of clarity, accessibility, transparency, and predictability on both the 
                                                          
125 Hertel v. Switzerland, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1998), § 46; see also Tolstoy-Miloslavsky v. 
United Kingdom, (1995) 20 EHRR 442; markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beerman v. Germany, 3 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). 
126 Hate Speech, FACEBOOK (2019), https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_ 
speech. 
127 The Twitter Rules, supra note 51. 
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dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable speech, and in the application and 
enforcement of these rules.129  
In some ways, this is a relatively easy standard to apply to a private sector 
context, since the platforms’ content moderation structure engages many of the same 
values. It is equally important in the context of “platform law” for individuals to 
understand the boundaries of acceptable speech, so that they may regulate their 
conduct appropriately. If it is not clear what the rules are, even enforcement actions 
that are carefully thought out will appear capricious or arbitrary, which hurts the 
perceived legitimacy of the system. 
One obvious starting point is for platforms to narrow and clarify their content 
rules. Rather than relatively open-ended statements, such as a commitment to “take 
action” against “excessively aggressive insults that target an individual, including 
content that contains slurs or similar language” but “not action against every instance 
where insulting terms are used,”130 the content standard could be amended to include 
a clear definition of prohibited speech, and a specific description of the range of 
appropriate responses depending on the perceived severity of the offence. The 
purpose would be to minimize discretion and unpredictability, and allow all 
stakeholders, including end-users, governments, moderators, and advertisers, to get 
a clear and comprehensive picture of the boundaries of acceptable speech based on 
the language. The global nature of platforms means that all of this information should 
be translated as widely as possible, to facilitate their accessibility among smaller 
linguistic communities.131 
Clarity and accessibility are equally important in understanding how the rules 
are applied, including the procedures for flagging particular content, or appealing 
against an adverse decision. More broadly, it is important to shed light on the entire 
range of moderation tools that platforms have at their disposal. This means not just 
explaining how a platform decides whether to delete particular content, but also 
determinations to promote or suppress it, and the range of subtler tools that platforms 
employ to curate information flows. 
                                                          
129 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 34, supra note 4, ¶ 25. 
130 The Twitter Rules, supra note 51. 
131 According to a Reuters report from April 2019, Facebook’s content standards are available in 
41 languages, though the platform itself is available in 111 languages. Maggie Fick & Paresh Dave, 
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Civil society have long called for more information into how content 
moderation actually works.132 This is an obvious advocacy focus, as greater 
understanding of how the systems operate is a precondition to presenting meaningful 
recommendations for their improvement. To the platforms’ credit, transparency 
reporting with regard to complaints and enforcement has now become 
commonplace.133 However, thus far the platforms’ moves toward releasing more data 
has been seen by many as insufficient.134 Academic and civil society researchers 
have demonstrated significant gaps in disclosure in these reports, as well as 
inconsistencies in how different types of takedowns are characterized, and a 
continuing lack of clarity regarding enforcement.135 
From a human rights perspective, it should not be surprising that the current 
reporting mechanisms have proven ineffective at fostering public trust. It would 
clearly be insufficient if public accountability over, say, the police force, was limited 
to analyzing their press releases and published statistics. Robust public oversight, 
where it exists, takes place not merely through periodic decisions by the agencies to 
release data, but also through a public right to request information, which transforms 
the oversight process into an interactive dialogue, rather than a one-sided process of 
disclosure.136 
The right to request information manifests in different ways across different 
legal contexts.137 However, over the past two decades, it has become firmly 
entrenched in global understandings of freedom of expression as a human right.138 
                                                          
132 See, e.g., Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation 
(May 7, 2018), https://santaclaraprinciples.org; see also DAVID KAYE, SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL 
STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE INTERNET (Colum. Glob. Rep. 2019); see also European Commission, 
Tackling Illegal Content Online (Sept. 28, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/ digital-single-market/en/news/ 
communication-tackling-illegal-content-online-towards-enhanced-responsibility-online-platforms. 
133 See, e.g., Facebook’s Community Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK, https:// 
transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement. 
134 Sergei Hovyadinov, Toward a More Meaningful Transparency: Examining Twitter, Google, 
and Facebook’s Transparency Reporting and Removal Practices in Russia, SSRN (Nov. 30, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3535671; Nathalie Maréchal & Ellery Roberts Biddle, It’s Not Just the Content, 
It’s the Business Model: Democracy’s Online Speech Challenge, NEW AM: RANKING DIG. RIGHTS 
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/its-not-just-content-its-business-model/. 
135 Id. 
136 TOBY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY (2003) 
[hereinafter MENDEL, FREEDOM]. 
137 In the United States, this right is generally managed under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (1967). 
138 See, e.g., Claude Reyes and Others v. Chile, (2006) Inter-Am. Ct. HR (Ser. C) No. 151; Társaság 
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In its essence, the right to information grants stakeholders an ability to file requests 
with public bodies for the release of any material under their control, subject to 
limited and specific exceptions to disclosure which protect core public interests.139 
In some countries, national right to information legislation already obligates 
private companies to respond to information requests in certain circumstances.140 
Likewise, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a 
California-based, not-for-profit public-benefit corporation which coordinates the 
global domain name system, has a Documentary Information Disclosure Policy built 
into its bylaws, which is essentially based on a governmental model of facilitating 
public requests.141 Many international financial institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank, have their own mechanisms for 
facilitating access to information requests.142 It may seem ambitious to envision a 
parallel commitment from platforms, that information related to content moderation 
would be made open by default and publicly available upon request. But such bold 
thinking is necessary in order to foster a level of trust and legitimacy concomitant to 
their enormous power and influence over the public discourse. 
None of this is to suggest that content moderation should take place in an 
environment of total transparency. As commercial entities, platforms will have a 
legitimate need to protect their own commercially sensitive information or trade 
secrets. Likewise, it is possible that the release of certain information about the 
moderation process could undermine the efficacy of enforcement systems, or enable 
users to game the system to promote their own content. There will also be privacy 
                                                          
139 See MENDEL, FREEDOM, supra note 136. 
140 S. AFR. CONST., Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000. South Africa’s law, which 
applies relatively broadly to the private sector, is something of an outlier, but it is relatively common for 
such laws to apply to private companies which accept public funding (to the extent of that funding), or 
which perform a public function. For example, Mexico’s General Act of Transparency and Access to 
Public Information applies to “any individual, legal entity or union who receives and uses public resources 
or performs acts of authority of the Federation, the States and the municipalities.” General Act of 
Transparency and Access to Public Information, Código Civil, art. 23, Diario Official de la Federación 
[DOF] 20-04-2015 (Mex.). 
141 ICANN, ICANN Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (Feb. 2, 2012), https://www 
.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en. 
142 W. BANK, Bank Policy: Access to Information (July 1, 2015), pubdocs.worldbank.org/ 
en/393051435850102801/World-Bank-Policy-on-Access-to-Information-V2.pdf; INTER-AMERICAN 
DEV. BANK, Access to Information Policy (Apr. 26, 2010), idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx 
?docnum=35167427. For a broader discussion of transparency policies at international institutions; see 
Michael Karanicolas, Openness Policies of the International Financial Institutions: Failing to Make the 
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concerns against disclosing certain information related to individual moderation 
decisions.  
However, these same challenges also exist in the context of governments, 
international financial institutions, and ICANN. Right-to-information laws contain 
exceptions to disclosure that address these issues. For example, they commonly 
contain an exception against disclosure of material which would cause commercial 
harm, either to the government itself or to outside institutions which, in confidence, 
supplied the government with sensitive information.143 Another common exception 
to disclosure is for information which might be expected to undermine the efficacy 
of law enforcement or regulatory enforcement.144 Likewise, right-to-information 
legislation commonly includes an exception to disclosure for material whose release 
would impact personal privacy.145 While these rules are not always an exact match 
for the specific context that platforms operate in, they could be adapted to purpose 
quite easily. Governments, quasi-public entities and international financial 
institutions, around the world are able to maintain the integrity of their activities 
while adhering to principles that information should be considered open by default 
and available upon request, subject to limited and specific exceptions. There is no 
reason why platforms could not adhere to parallel standards, as far as information 
connected to their content moderation processes are concerned. 
C. Serving a Legitimate Purpose 
The second branch of the three-part test, that limitations on speech must serve 
a legitimate purpose, is more difficult to translate, since it restricts the grounds under 
which governments may impose restrictions. Here platforms would need to be 
accorded much wider discretion, given their inherent right to promote discourse of a 
particular character. If, for example, a platform was created with the explicit purpose 
of facilitating sports-related discussions, they might want to impose a rule that any 
off-topic conversations (those not related to sports) would be subject to deletion. 
Such a broad rule, while obviously inappropriate for governments to impose on the 
general population, would be fine in a more limited private sector context. More 
                                                          
143 For example, Romania exempts from disclosure “information about financial or commercial 
activities if, according to the law, its release is detrimental to the principle of fair competition.” Law 
544/12 on Free Access to Public Information (2001) (Rom.). For the American approach to the 
intersection of commercially sensitive matters with the Freedom of Information Act, see John Delaney, 
Safeguarding Washington’s Trade Secrets: Protecting Businesses from Public Records Requests, 92 
WASH. L. REV. 1905 (2017). 
144 See, e.g., Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, s. 16(1) (Can.). 
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generally, platforms face commercial pressures in regulating speech which 
distinguish them from governments. 
However, there is still value in applying this branch of the test, insofar as it 
mandates that restrictions should be established and applied “in the light of 
universality of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination.”146 In practical 
terms, this might be understood as imposing standards of consistency and coherence, 
supporting a need for platforms to apply their rules in a manner which is consistent 
with that purpose, and which does not improperly discriminate, for example by 
judging LGBTQ expressions of intimacy or sexuality against a harsher standard than 
parallel heterosexual expressions. 
More generally, the second branch of the test requires that restrictions on 
speech be connected to some sort of distinct and overarching policy rationale. In the 
case of a government, this might mean justifying a restriction on tobacco advertising 
by connecting it to the broader aim of protecting public health. In the case of 
platforms, while the categories of restriction may be more open-ended, the 
requirement to cite some underlying purpose for the restriction is nonetheless 
valuable to moving the enforcement system away from appearing discretionary and 
capricious. It is also a necessary precondition for assessing the impact of the rule 
against its benefits, in line with the third branch of the test. 
D. Necessary and Proportionate 
The third branch of the three-part test, which focuses on the necessity of the 
restriction to achieve the objective and the proportionality of the impact on freedom 
of expression as set against this goal, is where much of the heavy lifting is 
traditionally done in assessing potential violations of the ICCPR, or parallel regional 
treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Inherent in this branch 
of the test is an understanding that government limits on speech should be tailored 
as narrowly as possible in order to achieve their objective.147 In other words, there is 
an implicit assumption that a light-touch approach, with minimal interferences in the 
public discourse, is preferable. 
The problem with applying this framework to the context of major platforms is 
that, in practical terms, there are technical challenges which effectively preclude a 
hands-off approach to moderation. While some platforms may appear to be less 
active than others in deleting controversial content, this does not mean that 
moderation is not taking place. At a bare minimum, every platform acts to combat 
                                                          
146 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 34, supra note 4, ¶ 32. 
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known threats such as the distribution of malware, or to remove spam, as part of their 
routine security posture.148 These efforts are necessary to keep the services usable on 
a basic level. Likewise, when YouTube selects which videos to auto-play for users, 
or which videos appear on its homepage, or when Facebook curates which posts 
appear in a person’s News Feed, this is a form of moderation. While these decisions 
may be subtler than deletions, they can be incredibly consequential to the spread or 
suppression of particular messages. There are a few platforms which do not carry out 
this kind of moderation, but these tend to be relatively fringe exceptions.149 For 
global platforms, the vast firehose of content which they host requires a relatively 
strong hand in managing how information is presented to users. 
In this sense, content moderation may be considered as more comparable to a 
positive freedom of expression obligation, rather than a negative restriction on 
speech.150 A good analogy to understanding this is how international human rights 
law treats broadcast regulation. In contrast to the light-touch approach favored for 
most forms of media, international human rights law has long recognized that a 
stronger regulatory hand is necessary in the broadcasting space.151 There are a 
number of rationales for this distinction, including the notion that spectrum is a 
limited resource which must be rationed, and that government intervention is 
necessary in order to prevent broadcasters from interfering with one another’s 
transmissions.152 However, in essence, the principle is that the nature of the broadcast 
medium is such that government intervention in the space is necessary for it to work. 
This pulls the calculus away from a traditional necessity and proportionality test, 
whereby freedom of expression is balanced against a competing value (such as 
                                                          
148 See, e.g., Shabnam Shaik, Improvements in protecting the integrity of activity on Facebook, 
FACEBOOK (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-security/improvements-in-
protecting-the-integrity-of-activity-on-facebook/10154323366590766; see also Malware Checkpoint for 
Facebook, FACEBOOK (July 10, 2012), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-security/malware-
checkpoint-for-facebook/10150902333195766/. 
149 See, e.g., AP Explains: What is the online forum 8chan?, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/39b7182524204189bbffab516a9df393; see also Sarah Emerson, Founder of Voat, the 
‘Censorship-Free’ Reddit, Begs Users to Stop Making Death Threats, VICE (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www 
.vice.com/en_us/article/gy4gzy/founder-of-voat-the-censorship-free-reddit-begs-users-to-stop-making-
death-threats. 
150 MENDEL, Restricting, supra note 105. 
151 See, e.g., Access to the Airwaves Principles on Freedom of Expression and Broadcast 
Regulation, ART. 19 (Mar. 2002), https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/accessairwaves 
.pdf; see also Recommendation 2007(2) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Media 
Pluralism and Diversity of Media Content (Jan. 31, 2007), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details 
.aspx?ObjectId=09000016805d6be3. 
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national security),153 and towards an analysis of the competing expressive costs and 
benefits of a particular intervention, to ensure that the resulting framework is 
beneficial to freedom of expression.154 
As applied to the context of platforms, this means that moderation decisions 
should not be assessed as an “interference” with freedom of expression, any more 
than a decision to grant a broadcasting license to one applicant over another is 
assessed an interference with the latter’s rights. In that case, the general 
understanding that governments have an obligation to allocate spectrum, which in 
turn requires denying space to some applicants, would mean that a human rights 
analysis would focus on whether the system to allocate licenses as a whole served 
the public interest, and whether it was administered and enforced in a fair, 
accountable and transparent manner. Rather than considering whether a moderation 
policy or decision is strictly necessary to achieve a given aim, applying the necessary 
and proportionate standard in the context of content moderation at platforms requires 
an assessment of whether the structure adequately respects, protects and promotes 
the expressive interests of all of the parties involved, as well as the broader public. 
This means a careful consideration of the impacts of a particular moderation or 
enforcement posture on freedom of expression, both for good and for ill, in order to 
maximize the promotional and positive aspects while minimizing harmful or 
restrictive ones. 
For example, in recent years there has been an increasing move to automate 
content moderation structures, including filtering technologies which flag and delete 
material at the point of upload.155 In the context of governmental restrictions, 
automated content filtering systems are generally viewed as an unjustifiable 
interference with freedom of expression.156 The rationale for this is that filtering 
systems, by proactively removing content at the point of creation, are effectively 
analogous to a form of prior censorship, which itself is generally unacceptable 
according to international human rights standards.157 
                                                          
153 Alec Stone Sweet & Judkins Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 68 (2008). 
154 For an application of this calculus to the field of copyright law, another area where restrictions 
on speech are generally employed for the sake of promoting speech, see Michael Karanicolas, 
Reconceptualising Copyright: Adapting the Rules to Respect Freedom of Expression in the Digital Age, 
CENTRE L. & DEMOC. (2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3423085.  
155 See, e.g., Leron Solomon, Fair Users or Content Abusers? The Automatic Flagging of Non-
Infringing Videos by Content ID on YouTube, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 237 (2015) (discussing the persistent 
failure to apply fair use doctrine in alleged cases of copyright infringement). 
156 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and 
Propaganda, supra note 65, at ¶ 1.g. 
157 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet, ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION 
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But in the context of platforms, and of understanding moderation structures as 
necessary to support freedom of expression, a proportionality assessment presents a 
more nuanced picture. Given the scale at which platforms operate, the speed with 
which information spreads, and the impact that abandoning proactive assessments 
might have on, say, the ability to detect malware and spam, there is an argument to 
be made that abandoning these filters would actually be broadly harmful to freedom 
of expression, since it would severely degrade the expressive environment. 
However, when one considers the broader impacts of automated filtering for 
content which is more contextual, such as hate speech or “terrorist speech,” the 
calculus becomes more difficult. One could still make an argument that letting such 
material run rampant would be counter to freedom of expression, since users will not 
want to engage in a platform which is overridden with toxicity. However, in 
considering the broader impacts of such a system, one would also have to consider 
that it is vastly more difficult to automatically identify hate speech or “terrorist 
speech,” or for that matter abuse or harassment, than it is to identify malware or child 
sexual abuse material. This leads to a greater potential for negative impacts, since 
there will necessarily be more collateral damage, or “by-catch,” to such a system. As 
a consequence, one might conclude that applying automated systems to these 
categories of content would require greater safeguards in order to satisfy this branch 
of the test. This might include limiting automated takedowns to content which has 
been pre-identified as prohibited (as opposed to allowing automated systems to 
independently assess whether material is prohibited), or requiring human 
confirmation for takedowns, or some form of random auditing by a human. 
It is worth noting that this calculus is not static, and can shift over time or in 
response to emerging events. For example, there have been a number of recent 
incidences where platforms have imposed emergency moderation measures in 
response to a pressing crisis.158 Where such emergency measures have been imposed, 
it is reasonable to carry out an assessment within the specific emergency context that 
exists, though it is equally imperative to reassess these factors once the situation has 
passed, rather than allowing them to become the default way of doing things. 
To be clear, the preceding arguments are not intended to make a broader case 
for assessing government interferences into digital speech as analogous to broadcast 
regulation, with all the leeway that that implies. Nor do they resolve human rights 
challenges related to the indirect nature of governmental enforcement actions that 
are currently being “laundered” through private sector platforms. However, in 
developing an assessment mechanism for decisions which are taken independently 
                                                          
158 See, e.g., Vijaya Gadde & Matt Derella, An update on our continuity strategy during COVID-






J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XX – 2019-2020 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










by platforms, this modified version of the three-part test helps to square the circle 
between human rights law and platform law, and allows platforms to apply a robust 
and extensive volume of international standard-setting work in this space to better 
inform and guide their decisionmaking. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article is not intended to provide a comprehensive definition of what 
policies platforms should adopt to fulfil their obligations as global gatekeepers for 
online speech. In considering each policy at each platform, it will be necessary to 
undertake a careful and contextual analysis, which will in turn require an in-depth 
understanding of the expressive environment which the platform itself hosts, and the 
impact that every decision has on curating that environment. At the moment, only 
the platforms themselves have access to the depth of information which might be 
necessary to carry out such an analysis. Hopefully, as conversations around 
improving global content moderation structures move forward, and academics and 
civil society experts continue to engage on these issues, that dynamic will change, as 
more global expertise is brought to bear on resolving the thorny problems of defining 
appropriate boundaries for online speech in the platform realm. 
The internet has, since its early days, been viewed as a great disruptor, 
unleashing enormous changes on a range of industries, and transforming the lives of 
vast numbers of people. The nature of online speech has been at the forefront of these 
impacts, driving a concomitant need to radically rethink the rules around freedom of 
expression. But while regulatory systems may need to be revised, the core values 
that underlie them continue to reflect a carefully constructed balance, which has 
developed through the engagement of many of the smartest minds of the past century. 
These principles have weathered a number of storms and challenges before, and 
emerged more resilient and vital to democratic culture than ever. 
This Article does not suggest turning back the clock. It is clear that platforms’ 
own content decisions are now an enormously influential component of the global 
public discourse. Moreover, there are important benefits to this, such as the enduring 
ability of people living in repressive corners of the world to use online technologies 
as a means of skirting the repressive restrictions that surround traditional 
communication. However, this thrusts enormous responsibilities onto the shoulders 
of private sector platforms, who now bear a level of influence that rivals, and in some 
cases even exceeds, that of nation States. While platforms are still conceptually 
different from governments, it is clear that a rights-based framework presents the 
clearest and most effective avenue for supporting freedom of expression in the 
application of their policies. While this Article does not portend to provide a 
complete definition for how platforms can manage their role in accordance with 
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that should support this conversation going forward, and guide the application of 
international freedom of expression standards to the context of platform law. 
